

Dobrica Ćosić, "Za jugoslavenstvo nacionalnih kultura," *Naprijed* [Organ of the Communist Party of Croatia] #49, 28 November 1952.

⁸⁴Ćosić has asserted that he took up the cudgels against Pirjevec only at the request of leading figures in the Serbian Party (Đukić, *Čovek*, 125-26.) And some of Pirjevec's contemporaries reported that his texts bore corrections by a top Slovene official, Boris Krajer. Dimitrij Rupel, *Slovenski intelektualci: od vojaške do civilne družbe* (Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, 1989), 103.

⁸⁵The Ćosić-Pirjevec polemic, which began with an interview Ćosić gave to the *Zagreb Telegram* on January 20, 1961, was conducted through the pages of *Naša sodobnost* [Ljubljana] and *Delo* [Belgrade] between March of 1961 and May of 1962. The Pirjevec quotation is from his "Oprostite, kako ste rekli?," *Naša sodobnost* 9/3 (March 1961), 287. The Ćosić quotation is from his "O savremenom nesavremenom nacionalizmu," *Delo* 7/12 (December 1961), 1417-21. The polemic is discussed at length in Chapter 1 of Budding, "Serb Intellectuals and the National Question, 1961-1991."

⁸⁶An excellent discussion of the political constellation of 1962 with special attention to the March Executive Committee meeting is Slovene historian Božo Repe's two-part article "Utrinki iz bližnjega leta 1962," *Teorija in praksa* 26/11-12 (1989), 1498-1511 and 27/1-2 (1990), 224-231.

⁸⁷During the war, Ranković had served as the first head of the Communists' security service. He maintained a degree of control over this service even after he officially moved on to higher offices, until his fall from power. For basic biographical data on Ranković, see Zoran Sekulić, *Pad i čutnja Aleksandra Rankovića* (Belgrade: Dositej, 1989), 9-12; and (for Ranković's continuing *de facto* control over the security forces) Krste Crvenkovski, quoted in Jovan Kesar and Pero Simić, *Oproštaj bez milosti* (Belgrade: Akvarijus, 1990), 192-23.

⁸⁸For an account of the political events surrounding Ranković's fall, see Rusinow's *Yugoslav Experiment*, 183-91. See also pp. 156-7 for a balanced evaluation of Ranković's career.

When the taboo on discussing the Brioni Plenum crumbled in the late 1980s, politicians who had known Ranković portrayed him as an old-style Communist, deeply suspicious of decentralization and democratization, but also unwaveringly loyal to Tito. The politicians - all participants at Brioni - who in later interviews expressed their conviction that Ranković was loyal to Tito included Koča Popović, Krste Crvenkovski (who headed the Party commission that investigated Ranković), and Miko Tripalo (who also served on the commission). In their later statements, Crvenkovski and Tripalo stood behind the commission's findings that the security services had become a force above the Party, but rejected the idea that Ranković was plotting against Tito. (Tripalo, however, believed that although Ranković did not aim to overthrow Tito, he was trying to position himself to succeed him.) For Popović's views, see Aleksandar Nenadović, *Razgovori s Kočem*, 3rd expanded edition (Zagreb: Globus, 1989), 140-42. For Crvenkovski's, see Kesar and Simić, *Oproštaj*, 178-85. For Tripalo's, see Miko Tripalo, *Hrvatsko proljeće* (Zagreb: Globus, 1990), 69-81 and Kesar and Simić, *Oproštaj*, 198.

⁸⁹*Šesta sednica*, 63 and 322. In the post-1945 Yugoslav political lexicon, "unitarism" or "unitarist Yugoslavism" covered a multitude of sins. Defined as the "theoretical or practical denial" of Yugoslavia's multinational character and resultant political arrangements, it could mean anything from seeking more powers for the federal government to advocating the creation of a Yugoslav nation - which was also called "integral Yugoslavism." Stipe Šuvar, "Unitarizam i nacionalizam u suvremenoj jugoslavenskoj stvarnosti," in *Nacionalno: nacionalističko: eseji i polemički prilozi* (Split: Marksistički centar, 1974), 160. Cf. Jovan Raičević, "O centralizmu i decentralizmu, jugoslovenstvu i nacionalizmu," *Socijalizam* 9/4 (April 1966), 450-53. For the usage of "integral Yugoslavism," see Edvard Kardelj, *Razvoj slovenskega narodnega vprašanja* (Ljubljana: Državna založba Slovenije, 1957), lxiv; and Raičević, "O centralizmu," 451. Unitarist Yugoslavism was held to be the most common and most dangerous form of Serbian nationalism (though it was also emphasized that Serbian nationalism had other forms, and unitarism other sources.) In addition to Šuvar's "Unitarizam," see his *Nacije i međunacionalni odnosi u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji* (Zagreb: Naše teme, 1970), 97-107.

⁹⁰It was for the same reason that each of the positions Ranković vacated upon his fall was filled by another Serb (Rusinow, *Yugoslav Experiment*, 190). Casting Ranković as a Serbian nationalist ultimately encouraged Serbs themselves to perceive his fall in national terms. At the Sixth Plenum, Serbian leaders warned that some ("isolated") voices were warning that Serbia had lost its representative at the top, and that now its interests would be neglected. (See, *inter alia*, the speech of Dobrivoje Radosavljević, *Šesta sednica*, 25). As time went on - above all, as Serbs came to feel increasingly threatened in Kosovo - the picture of Ranković as protector of the Serbs gained mythic

proportions. When he died in 1983, his funeral became the scene of the first Serbian mass demonstration in Yugoslavia's post-war history.

⁹¹The amendments and their political context are well covered in Steven L. Burg, *Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983). See pp. 67-73 for the 1967 package and pp. 74-77 for the 1968 package. For the legislative changes, see also Rusinow, *Yugoslav Experiment*, 228.

⁹²For constitutional changes affecting Kosovo, see Sami Repishti, "The Evolution of Kosova's Autonomy Within the Yugoslav Constitutional Framework" in Arshi Pipa and Sami Repishti, *Studies on Kosova* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1984), 195-232; and Monika Beckmann-Petey, *Der jugoslawische Föderalismus* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1984), 106-117. It should be noted that all the constitutional changes cited affected Vojvodina as well as Kosovo.

⁹³For the region's names in Albanian and in Serbo-Croatian, see Roux, *Les Albanais en Yougoslavie*, 41-44.

⁹⁴Haberl, *Parteiorganisation*, 85-6.

⁹⁵Repishti, "The Evolution of Kosova's Autonomy" 213-14.

⁹⁶See Burg, *Conflict and Cohesion*, Chapter Four; Rusinow, *Yugoslav Experiment*, 283-87; and Dušan Bilandžić, *Historija Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije, Glavni procesi 1918-1985* (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1985), 373-81.

⁹⁷Rusinow, *Yugoslav Experiment*, 285.

⁹⁸The best source for the decentralization of the Party is Othmar Haberl, *Parteiorganisation und Nationale Frage in Jugoslawien* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harassowitz, 1976).

⁹⁹For the Ninth Congress, see Haberl, *Parteiorganisation*, 87-102; Rusinow, *Yugoslav Experiment*, 255-60; and Bilandžić, *Historija*, 341-6.

¹⁰⁰All figures in this paragraph are taken from Bilandžić, *Historija*, 385-89.

¹⁰¹Croatian economist Branko Horvat, in an interesting contemporary discussion of the problem, points out that this anomie was an unintended consequence of Yugoslavia's having abandoned the regimented work forces of Stalinism. Branko Horvat, in "Da li je nacionalizam naša sudbina?," (a roundtable discussion held at the Belgrade *Dom omladine*, 5 February 1971), *Delo* 17/1 (1971): 7.

¹⁰²Rusinow, *Yugoslav Experiment*, 202-09.

¹⁰³According to both Yugoslav and foreign observers, insecurity was pervasive in the Yugoslavia of the late 1960s. See, e.g., Horvat, in "Da li je nacionalizam...", 7. Rusinow, *Yugoslav Experiment*, 266-73, describes the phenomenon as a "grande peur."

¹⁰⁴The Croatian national movement has been extensively covered in academic literature. It is the subject of one monograph: Ante Cuvalo, *The Croatian National Movement, 1966-1972* (Columbia University Press: East European Monographs, 1990). It is also thoroughly discussed in the standard works on post-war Yugoslavia: see Rusinow, *Yugoslav Experiment*, Chapter 7 *passim* and pp. 308-15; Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism*, Chapter 7; and Burg, *Conflict and Cohesion*, pp. 121-66. See also George Schöpflin, "The Ideology of Croatian Nationalism," *Survey* 19/1 (Winter 1973), 123-46 for an interesting analysis of the movement's content. In recent years, important participants have produced a flood of memoirs and interviews. See especially the collection of interviews edited by Milovan Baletić, *Ljudi iz 1971: prekinuta šutnja* (Zagreb: Dopunski izdavački program Vjesnik, 1990); and Miko Tripalo's *Hrvatsko proljeće*.

¹⁰⁵See Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism*, 98-104.

¹⁰⁶For useful summaries of the events of the language controversy, see Thomas F. Magner, "Language and nationalism in Yugoslavia," *Canadian Slavic Studies* 1.3 (1967), 333-47 and Christopher Spalatin, "Language and politics in Yugoslavia in the light of events which happened from March 17, 1967, to March 14, 1969," *Journal of Croatian Studies* 20 (1979), 2-16.

For explications in English of the Croatian point of view, see Branko Franolić, "Language policy in Yugoslavia with special reference to Croatian," *Journal of Croatian Studies* 25-26 (1984-85), 126-152; and Vinko Grubišić, "The Croatian language in the constitutional development of the Socialist Republic of Croatia and of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia," *Journal of Croatian Studies* 30 (1989), 139-152. Antun Nizeteo,

"Differences between the Croatian and Serbian Literary Languages," *Journal of Croatian Studies* 25-26 (1984-85), 104-21, clearly states the Croatian case for two separate languages, explaining that the argument is qualitative (based essentially on literary tradition and national consciousness), rather than quantitative (based on the differences between Croatian and Serbian standards). Cf. Ivo Banac, "Main trends in the Croat language question," in *Aspects of the Slavic Language Question*, Volume I, (New Haven: Yale Concilium on International and Area Studies, 1984), 189-259. See also the works of Dalibor Brozović and Ljudevit Jonke, the two most important linguists associated with the Maspok.

¹⁰⁷The full text of the Declaration appears in Christopher Spalatin, "Serbo-Croatian or Serbian and Croatian? Considerations on the Croatian Declaration and the Serbian Proposal of March 1967," *Journal of Croatian Studies* 7-8 (1966-67), 3-13.

¹⁰⁸Slovene liberalism is the subject of an excellent monograph by Božo Repe, "Liberalizem" v Sloveniji," *Borec* 44/9-10 (1992), 673-949. (Besides an in-depth treatment of Slovenia, the work includes an interesting comparison with contemporary developments in other republics.) This summary of the Slovene leaders' aims is based mainly on Repe's discussion on p. 944.

¹⁰⁹See Mark Baskin, "The secular state as ethnic entrepreneur: Macedonians and Bosnian Moslems in socialist Yugoslavia," *Michigan Discussions in Anthropology* 7 (1984): 99-134. Cf. Chapter Four of Shoup, *Communism*, and Chapter Nine of Stephen E. Palmer and Robert R. King, *Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian question* (New York: Archon Books, 1971).

¹¹⁰This summary is based on Stella Alexander, *Church and State in Yugoslavia since 1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), Chapter Nine and *passim*; Stevan Pavlowitch, "The Orthodox church in Yugoslavia: the problem of the Macedonian church," *Eastern Churches Review* (1967): 374-386; and Palmer and King, *Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question*, 165-73.

¹¹¹See especially Pavlowitch, "The Orthodox church in Yugoslavia," 381-83.

¹¹²Wolfgang Höpken, "Die jugoslawischen Kommunisten und die bosnischen Muslime," in Andreas Kappeler et. al., eds., *Die Muslime in der Sowjetunion und in Jugoslawien* (Cologne: Markus Verlag, 1989), 181-210, offers an excellent analysis of the Party's changing policy. See also Francine Friedman, *The Bosnian Muslims: Denial of a Nation*, Chapter 6.

Other useful works include: Alija Isaković, ed., *O "nacionaliziranju" Muslimana: 101 godina afirmiranja i negiranja nacionalnog identiteta Muslimana* (Zagreb: Globus, 1990); Ivo Banac, "Bosnian Muslims: from religious community to socialist nationhood and post-communist statehood, 1918-1992," in Mark Pinson, ed., *The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina: their historic development from the Middle Ages to the dissolution of Yugoslavia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 129-53; Zachary T. Irwin, "The fate of Islam in the Balkans: a comparison of four state policies," in Pedro Ramet, ed., *Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1989), 378-410; and Dennison Rusinow, "Yugoslavia's Muslim Nation," *UFSI Reports* No. 8 (1982): 1-8. Mark Baskin, "The secular state as ethnic entrepreneur," 114-17, draws an interesting contrast between the LCY's vigorous promotion of Macedonian nationhood, and its late and reluctant espousal of Muslim nationhood.

¹¹³This view was reflected in the census of 1953, which introduced a "Yugoslav – undetermined" category and (unlike the census of 1948) offered no specifically Muslim options.

¹¹⁴Of people with Muslim names listed in the 1956 Yugoslav *Who's Who*, 61.5% identified themselves nationally as Serbs, 16.6% as Croats, 8.6% as Yugoslavs, and the rest not at all. David A. Dyker, "The Ethnic Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina - Some Basic Socioeconomic Data," *Slavonic and East European Review* 50 (1972): 245, cited in Höpken, "Die jugoslawischen Kommunisten," 195. Cf. Ivo Banac, "Bosnian Muslims," 144-45.

¹¹⁵Among people who chose one of the "Muslim" options the breakdown was as follows: 71,991 Serb-Muslims, 25,295 Croat-Muslims, and 788,403 "nationally undetermined." See Friedman, *The Bosnian Muslims*, Tables 6.1 (p. 155) and 6.2 (p. 156); and Irwin, "Fate of Islam," 389. The census figures cited in this section are taken or calculated from Irwin.

¹¹⁶Irena Reuter-Hendrichs, "Jugoslawiens Muslime," *Südosteuropa Mitteilungen* 29/2 (1989): 108-10.

¹¹⁷See, e.g., the 1959 speech by a delegate to the League of Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina's Third Congress cited in Höpken, "Die jugoslawischen Kommunisten," 196.

¹¹⁸Cited in Höpken, "Die jugoslawischen Kommunisten," 197.

¹¹⁹See the sources collected in Isaković, *O "nacionaliziranju" Muslimana*, 149-226. Cf. Baskin, "The secular state as ethnic entrepreneur," 115-16.

¹²⁰Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism*, 184.

¹²¹Baskin, "The secular state as ethnic entrepreneur," 119.

¹²²Wayne S. Vucinich, writing in 1969, argued that "attempts to foster the idea that Montenegrins are not Serbs but a distinct nation have thus far not been successful." Vucinich, "Nationalism and Communism," 268-69. Cf. Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism*, 116.

¹²³While in Yugoslav practice, *narod* was the standard word for "nation," in this context it must be understood as an ethnic group, and *nacija* as a nation in the modern sense. The same distinction was sometimes used at this time to argue that the Muslims were a *nacija*, but not a *narod*.

¹²⁴Milovan Djilas, "O crnogorskom nacionalnom pitanju," in *Članci 1941-1946* (Belgrade: Kultura, 1947). See especially 200-201.

¹²⁵Petar II Petrović Njegoš, prince-bishop of Montenegro from 1830 to 1851, was Montenegro's greatest poet, best known for *Gorski vijenac* (*The Mountain Wreath*). Mihailo Lalić (1914-1994) was the leading Montenegrin novelist of the post-war period.

For examples of the "Whose is..." form of argument, see, M. Jurišević, "15 dana," *Književne novine* 24 December 1966, pp. 1-2; Đordije Rašović, "Jedinstvo jezika," *Književne novine* 24 May 1969; and especially the speech of Veselin Đuranović at the Symposium on Montenegrin Culture, reported in *Pobjeda*, 4 February 1968.

¹²⁶For the Symposium, held on January 29-30, 1968, see *Pobjeda*, 4 February 1968. For a relatively hard-line anti-Serb tone, see, e.g., the speech of Veselin Đuranović (reported in *Pobjeda*). For a more moderate tone, see, e.g., the speeches of Vuko Pavičević and Vukašin Mićunović (*NIN*, 4 February 1968, pp. 8-9). The Symposium was controversial from the time it was planned, and some Serbs saw it as an example of the promotion of artificial disunity. See *Književne novine* 24 December 1966, 1-2; and 21 January 1967, 1. For the Platform on Culture, see *Borba*, 24 December 1970.

¹²⁷Lenard J. Cohen, "Ethnopolitical conflict in Yugoslavia: elites in Kosovo, 1912-1982," in Ronald H. Linden and Bert A. Rockman, eds., *Elite Studies and Communist Politics*, (Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies, 1984), 237-91; see especially 260-272 for Cohen's illuminating discussion of elite turnover in Kosovo after 1966. The population figures cited above are taken from Table 9.4 (253).

¹²⁸For flag use, see Jens Reuter, *Die Albaner in Jugoslawien* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1982), 47.

¹²⁹See Roux, *Les Albanais en Yougoslavie*, 290-91, for the significance of the various names.

¹³⁰Post-1945 education and language policy are well-covered in Roux, *Les Albanais en Yougoslavie*, Chapter 14.

¹³¹For the post-1966 events in the province, including the demonstrations of 1968, see Cohen, "Ethnopolitical Conflict in Kosovo," 260-63; Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*, 302-04; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 162-68; Pedro Ramet, "Kosovo and the limits of Yugoslav socialist patriotism," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, 16 (1989); and Reuter, *Die Albaner*, 48-50.

¹³²See Cohen, "Ethnopolitical Conflict in Kosovo," 262-64; and Radovan Bakić, "Kretanje stanovnika po nacionalnom sastavu u SAP Kosovo u periodu od 1961. do 1971. godine," *Glasnik Srpskog geografskog društva* 51 (1971), 97-100. Vučković and Nikolić, *Stanovništvo Kosova*, Tables 13 and 13-a (108-109) present the results of the 1948-91 censuses.

¹³³For examples of the Party's policy statements, see Budding, "Yugoslavs into Serbs," 410-12, from which this paragraph is adapted.

¹³⁴For the liberals' rise and fall, see Burg, *Conflict and Cohesion*, 167-78; Slavoljub Đukić *Slom srpskih liberala: tehnologija političkih obračuna Josipa Broza* (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 1990); and Latinka Perović, *Zatvaranje kruga: ishod političkog rascepa u SKJ 1971/1972* (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1991). This treatment of the Serbian liberals is adapted from Budding, "Serbian National Identity, 1961-1971," pp. 412-13. See also Chapter Two of Budding, "Serb Intellectuals and the National Question."

¹³⁵For statements of the liberal position on this issue, see Nikezić, "Srbija v socialistični skupnosti jugoslovanskih narodov in narodnosti," *Teorija in praksa* 7/12 (1970), 1694-96; and Perović, "Međunacionalni

odnosi u Srbiji i idejnopolićka uloga Saveza komunista," in *Međunacionalni odnosi i Savez komunista Srbije* (Belgrade: Institut za polićke studije FPN, 1969). See also the brief but valuable discussion of Serbian liberalism in Božo Repe, "'Liberalizem" v Sloveniji," *Borec* 44 (1992), 920-25.

¹³⁶See statements by Nikezić (*Borba*, 12 March 1971) and Perović (*Borba*, 11 September 1969). See also Perović, *Zatvaranje*, 65 and 110, and Đukić, *Slom srpskih liberala*, 212 and 240-245. For the economic effects of centralism, see Perović, "Međunacionalni odnosi u Srbiji," 126.

¹³⁷According to Bilandžić (*Historija*, 426), the Serbian leadership accepted decentralizing proposals in 1970, and radicalized them in 1971. The liberals' most important speeches in support of the amendments of 1971 are collected in *Ustavne promene* (Belgrade: Republički sekretarijat za informacije, 1971).

¹³⁸Perović in *Politika*, 6 December 1971 (just after the Karađorđevo meeting where Tito brought down the Croatian leaders).

¹³⁹*Politika*, 13 December 1970.

¹⁴⁰The liberals' faith in economic modernization as a solution to national problems was particularly evident in their approach to Kosovo. See Perović, "Međunacionalni odnosi," 127; Nikezić in *Politika*, 8 February 1969; and Đukić, *Slom srpskih liberala*, 131-2.

¹⁴¹For examples of all these approaches, see Chapter Three of Budding, "Serb Intellectuals and the National Question."

¹⁴²See "Rodu o jeziku," (*Književne novine* 1 April 1967, 10-11 and 15 April 1967, 11 and 14); *Borba* 22 April 1967; and (for the Proposal's text) *Borba* 2 April, 1967. English translations of the full texts of both the Declaration and the Proposal appear in Christopher Spalatin, "Serbo-Croatian or Serbian and Croatian? Considerations on the Croatian Declaration and the Serbian Proposal of March 1967," *Journal of Croatian Studies* 7-8 (1966-67), 3-13.

¹⁴³Zoran Gavrilović's speech of April 2, printed in "Rodu o jeziku," *Književne novine* 15 April 1967, 11.

¹⁴⁴14. sednica CK SK Srbije. Maj 1968. *Savez komunista u borbi za nacionalnu ravnopravnost* (Belgrade: Komunist, 1968), 100-116 and 297-300. Cf. Othmar Haberl, *Parteiorganisation und Nationale Frage in Jugoslawien*, 62-65.

¹⁴⁵Of course, some of the Plenum's significance depended on hindsight. In the 1980s, Ćosić's 14th Plenum warnings about Kosovo gave him the aura of a prophet. Slavoljub Đukić, *Čovek u svom vremenu* (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 1989), 189.

¹⁴⁶14. sednica, 105-08. By May of 1968, Ćosić's use of the term "Šiptar" was itself controversial. "Albanian" [*Albanac*] had become the approved term for Yugoslavia's Albanians. See Mahmut Bakalli's speech, 14. sednica, 80.

¹⁴⁷14. sednica, 108-09.

¹⁴⁸14. sednica, 111.

¹⁴⁹See 14. sednica, 314, and Rusinow, *Yugoslav Experiment*, 246. Historian Jovan Marjanović, who had put forward related though not identical arguments at the Plenum, was similarly censured and dropped. For more on the 14th Plenum, see Budding, "Serb Intellectuals and the National Question," Chapter Three.

¹⁵⁰Founded in 1892, the *Zadruga* was a publishing house devoted to the promotion of Serbian culture. Before the creation of the Yugoslav state, its efforts to link Serbs living under Habsburg and Ottoman rule with Serbia had often served as a substitute for forbidden political activities. The *Zadruga's* history from 1892 to 1992 is the subject of an excellent monograph: Ljubinka Trgovčević, *Istorija Srpske književne zadruge* (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1992). For more on the *Zadruga* under Ćosić's presidency, see Budding, "Serb Intellectuals and the National Question," Chapter Three.

¹⁵¹Ćosić called the *Zadruga* the "first pluralist forum in Serbian society after the war." Đukić, *Čovek*, 211.

¹⁵²Economist Kosta Mihailović, historian Radovan Samardžić, linguist Pavle Ivić, and philosopher Mihailo Marković - all later members of the commission that produced the draft Memorandum - came onto the *Zadruga* board in May of 1971. "64. godišnja skupština Srpske književne zadruge," *Glasnik Srpske književne zadruge* 26/no. 5 (20 June 1971), 31.

¹⁵³For these attacks, and the complicated relations between the Serbian liberals and the *Zadruga*, see Đukić, *Čovek*, 212-222, and *Slom srpskih liberala*, 97-98, 140-41, and 191-99. Cf. Trgovčević, *Istorija Srpske književne zadruge*, 274-79.

¹⁵⁴See especially Ćosić's speech at the *Zadruga's* 64th Annual Convention in May of 1971 (*Glasnik Srpske književne zadruge*, 26/5 (20 June 1971), 4-9), reprinted as "Porazi i ciljevi" in Ćosić, *Stvarno i moguće* (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 1988), 85-95. Ćosić's presidency made the *Zadruga* the closest surrogate available for an opposition political party with a Serbian national platform. As an exasperated Party official from Kosovo put it, *Zadruga* recruiters in his city relied on the pithy slogan "Join - you know who is at the head." Speech of Miloš Vujaković (Kosovska Mitrovica) at the 41st Plenum of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia. *Aktivnost Saveza komunista Srbije u borbi protiv nacionalizma i šovinizma u SR Srbiji* (Belgrade: Komunist, 1972), 37-41.

¹⁵⁵"Druga vanredna skupština Srpska književna zadruga održana 24. novembra 1969. godine u Beogradu," *Glasnik Srpske književne zadruge* 25/3, 2-4.

¹⁵⁶See, for instance, the emotional plea for Serbian unity delivered by a representative of *Prosvjeta*, the cultural society of Croatia's Serbs. Speech of Stanko Korać, in "64. godišnja skupština Srpske književne zadruge," *Glasnik Srpske književne zadruge*, 26/5 (20 June 1971), 21-22.

¹⁵⁷Speech of Dobrica Ćosić, in "64. godišnja skupština Srpske književne zadruge," *Glasnik Srpske književne zadruge*, 26/5 (20 June 1971), 4-9.

¹⁵⁸Cf. Burg, *Conflict and Cohesion*, 209-211, and Haberl, *Parteiorganisation*, 139-42.

¹⁵⁹These citations are from the speeches of Pavle Ristić (*Anali* 19/3, 220), Radovan Pavićević (*Anali* 19/3, 282), Budimir Košutić (*Anali* 19/3, 300), and Stevan Vračar (*Anali* 19/3, 334). See also the speeches of Andrija Gams (*Anali* 19/3, 234), and Aleksandar Ivić (*Anali* 19/3, 287).

¹⁶⁰The Law Faculty discussion was printed in *Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu* 19/3 (May-June 1971), 207-359. (This issue was banned, but later reissued in facsimile.) The words cited are those of Mihailo Đurić (*Anali* 19/3, 232) and Radoslav Stojanović (*Anali*, 19/3, 263).

¹⁶¹Professor Živomir Đorđević (b. 1922) expressed his own commitment to Yugoslavia, but urged the necessity of envisioning a possible post-Yugoslav and post-socialist future for Serbia: "It is possible that in the foreseeable future six or eight independent states will be formed on this soil. It's understood that I don't want this, but it shouldn't be excluded...Because of this no one has the right...to neglect the interests of Serbia. For Serbia existed before them and will exist after them. Serbia existed before socialism and will exist after socialism. Classes and social orders change, but the people and the land remain." *Anali* 19/3, 252.

¹⁶²*Anali* 19/3, 232-33.

¹⁶³*Anali* 19/3, 232.

¹⁶⁴Đurić was sentenced to two years in prison, a sentence reduced on appeal to nine months. Rajko Danilović, *Upotreba neprijatelja: politička suđenja 1945-1991 u Jugoslaviji* (Valjevo: Agencija Valjevac, 1993), 182-84.

¹⁶⁵Of course, the territorial principle was not applied *within* already-established political units. Republican leaders held firmly to their prerogatives: Macedonian leaders rejected any suggestion of territorial rights for their Albanian minority as firmly as Croatian leaders opposed the idea of autonomous Serb units. For the Macedonian stance, see Repe, "Liberalizem," 915.

¹⁶⁶Budimir Košutić, *Anali* 19/3, 301-2.

¹⁶⁷See the speeches of Pavle Ristić (*Anali* 19/3, 219); Andrija Gams (*Anali* 19/3, 239); and Živomir Đorđević (*Anali* 19/3, 249-51).

¹⁶⁸*Ustavne promene: šestnaesta sednica Predsedništva SKJ* (Belgrade: Komunist, 1971), 29.

¹⁶⁹The word *odnosno* indicates that the objects mentioned are (in the present context) equivalent. For instance, Amendment 35 of the 1971 package stated: "The President and Vice-President of the Presidency cannot be from the same republic or [*odnosno*] the same autonomous province." *Ustavne promene: šestnaesta sednica*, 254. (If Kardelj had used the word *odnosno* in its other sense, to correct a misstatement, it would presumably have been edited out before his speech was published.)

¹⁷⁰Stipe Šuvar, explaining why in 1964 the term "nationality" (*narodnost*) replaced "national minority" as the official designation for those inhabitants of Yugoslavia whose matrix-states lay elsewhere (Šuvar, *Nacije i međunacionalni odnosi*, 120). Cf. Sabrina Ramet's persuasive argument that the Titoist refusal to acknowledge the existence of minorities laid the basis for the theoretically limitless secessionist movements of the post-Yugoslav era. Ramet, "Introduction: the roots of discord and the language of war," in Ramet and Ljubiša Adamovich, eds., *Beyond Yugoslavia: politics, economics, and culture in a shattered community* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 5-6.

¹⁷¹Much of this material is adapted from Chapter Four of Budding, "Serb Intellectuals and the National Question."

Useful interpretive discussions of the 1970s include Bilandžić, *Historija*, 385-461; Burg, *Conflict and Cohesion*, Chapters 5-6; and Rusinow, *Yugoslav Experiment*, Chapter 8. See also William Zimmerman, *Open borders, nonalignment, and the political evolution of Yugoslavia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), Chapter 3. Burg offers the most material on the renewal of elite cooperation; Rusinow, on the Tito cult.

¹⁷²The Letter (*Pismo*) was published in the Yugoslav media on October 18, a few weeks after its distribution to Party members. Its text appears in Dragan Marković and Savo Kržavac, *Liberalizam od Đilasa do danas* (Belgrade: Sloboda, 1978), 2:187-95; the "Pismo" citations below refer to this source. For the Letter's history, see Marković and Kržavac, *Liberalizam*, 2:173-86 and Rusinow, *Yugoslav Experiment*, 321-26.

¹⁷³"Srbija pre i posle Pisma," (3-part article), *NIN* 8, 15 and 22 April 1973.

¹⁷⁴"Pismo," 190-91.

¹⁷⁵"Pismo," 194.

¹⁷⁶A number of cases in which intellectuals were arrested and imprisoned are discussed in Danilović, *Upotreba neprijatelja*, 178-94.

¹⁷⁷For instance, in this period Dobrica Ćosić, though barred from the official media and almost all opportunities for public speaking, continued to publish his novels. Similarly, the Praxis (critical Marxist) professors known as the "Belgrade Eight" (whose case became an international cause celebre in the mid-1970s), were forced out of teaching, but were offered research positions. For more on the Belgrade Eight see Gerson S. Sher, *Praxis: Marxist Criticism and Dissent in Socialist Yugoslavia* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), 226-32, and Chapter Four of Budding, "Serb Intellectuals and the National Question."

¹⁷⁸The reasons for this dramatic increase in debt are discussed in Bilandžić, *Historija*, 447-53; David A. Dyker, *Yugoslavia: Socialism, Development and Debt* (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), Chapters 5 and 6; Lampe et. al., *Yugoslav-American Economic Relations*, Chapter 6; and Laura D'Andrea Tyson, *The Yugoslav Economic System and its Performance in the 1970s* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1980).

¹⁷⁹Dyker, *Yugoslavia*, 171.

¹⁸⁰Zimmerman, *Open Borders*, 61-63.

¹⁸¹For the substance of Serbian grievances against the 1974 Constitution, see Vojin Dimitrijević, "Sukobi oko Ustava iz 1974.," in Nebojša Popov, ed., *Srpska strana rata: trauma i katarza u istorijskom pamćenju* (Belgrade: Republika, 1996), 447-71.

¹⁸²Cf. Serbian politician Dragoslav Marković's comment in Mirko Đekić, *Upotreba Srbije: optužbe i priznanja Draže Markovića* (Belgrade: Beseda, 1990), 41.

¹⁸³In practice, the process of "reaching agreement" was frequently applied even where not constitutionally required. For a sense of how federal decision-making worked under the 1974 constitution, see Chapter 5 of Burg, *Conflict and Cohesion*. It provides as clear an explanation as the subject matter allows.

¹⁸⁴Sruk, *Ustavno uređenje*, 304.

¹⁸⁵This interpretation of the 1974 Constitution follows Dušan Bilandžić's; see Bilandžić, *Historija*, 438-47.

¹⁸⁶Tyson, *Yugoslav Economic System*, Chapters 1 and 2, offers a good introduction to the theory and practice of associated labor and the OOUR. See also Bilandžić, *Historija*, 438-45 and Potts, *The Development of the System of Representation in Yugoslavia*, Chapter 5. For the "workers' amendments," see Rusinow, *Yugoslav Experiment*, 284.

¹⁸⁷As William Zimmerman has put it, "The attack on the market and on "technocratism" redistributed power away from the enterprise managers, the workers' self-management units, and the economy to the regional Party organizations and the political system." Zimmerman, *Open borders*, 51. Cf. Tyson, *Yugoslav Economic System*, 8-9.

¹⁸⁸Rusinow, *Yugoslav Experiment*, 331-2, offers a clear summary of the delegate system and its effects. A detailed discussion, focused on the commune, is George A. Potts, *The Development of the System of Representation in Yugoslavia with Special Reference to the Period Since 1974* (Lanham: University Press of America, Inc., 1996). Among Yugoslav authors, see Sruk, *Ustavno uređenje*, 257-68; and for the theory behind the system, Jovan R. Marjanović, *Delegatski sistem i politička reprezentacija* (Belgrade: Institut za političke studije Fakulteta političkih nauka, 1974). For a post-Yugoslav critique, see Dimitrijević, "Sukobi oko Ustava iz 1974.," 449-58.

¹⁸⁹The Blue Book's text was finally published in 1990, in Đekić's *Upotreba Srbije* (his book of interviews with Dragoslav Marković), pp. 123-74. In the notes below, "Plava knjiga," refers to this text.

For Marković's account of the writing of the Blue Book, see Đekić, *Upotreba*, 102-16.

¹⁹⁰The texts of the Serbian and provincial constitutions of 1974 can be found in *Ustav SR Srbije; Ustav SAP Vojvodine; Ustav SAP Kosova: sa ustavnim zakonima za sprovođenje ustava* (Belgrade: Službeni list SFRJ, 1974).

¹⁹¹"Plava knjiga," 141-45.

¹⁹²"Plava knjiga," 159.

¹⁹³"Plava knjiga," 131-36.

¹⁹⁴"Plava knjiga," 132-34.

¹⁹⁵"Plava knjiga," 153-54.

¹⁹⁶"Plava knjiga," 164-69.

¹⁹⁷Marković, *Život i politika* 2:334.

¹⁹⁸"Plava knjiga," 160-61.

¹⁹⁹"Plava knjiga," 172. The original is: "...da li i srpski narod, ravnopravno sa drugim narodima Jugoslavije ostvaruje svoje istorijsko pravo na nacionalnu državu u okviru jugoslovenske federacije koja počiva na principu nacionalnog samoopredeljenja."

²⁰⁰This section is adapted from Chapter 5 of Budding, "Serb Intellectuals and the National Question."

The best single introduction to Yugoslavia in the early 1980s is the collection of articles in Pedro Ramet, ed., *Yugoslavia in the 1980s* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985). A useful source (with an economic focus) for the decade as a whole is Harold Lydall, *Yugoslavia in Crisis* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).

²⁰¹Zagorka Golubović, "Od dijagnoze do objašnjenja "jugoslovenskog slučaja," *Sociološki pregled* 27 (1993), 43.

²⁰²Slaven Letica, *Intelektualac i kriza* (Zagreb: August Cesarec, 1989), 52.

²⁰³Ribičić's comments from February 1983 are cited in Pedro Ramet, "Yugoslavia and the Threat of Internal and External Discontents," *Orbis* 28/1 (1984), 109.

²⁰⁴See, for instance, Chris Martin and Laura D'Andrea Tyson, "Can Titoism Survive Tito? Economic Problems and Policy Choices Confronting Tito's Successors," in Ramet, ed., *Yugoslavia in the 1980s*, 184-200; and Lydall, *Yugoslavia in Crisis* (especially Chapter 5, "Underlying Causes of the Crisis.") On the other hand, Susan Woodward, in a recent study, puts external factors at the center, asserting that "Yugoslavia's dissolution began with fundamental changes in the international environment." Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 47.

²⁰⁵See Lydall, *Yugoslavia in Crisis*, Chapter 3; and Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, 50-57. A clear and concise treatment of the relation between the economic crisis and the rise of nationalism is Ilija Ika Todorović, "Regional Economic Nationalism in the Former Yugoslavia," in Raju G.C. Thomas and H. Richard Friman, eds., *The South Slav Conflict: History, Religion, Ethnicity, and Nationalism* (New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1996), 159-88.

²⁰⁶Lydall, *Yugoslavia in Crisis*, 9.

²⁰⁷Cf. Shkëlzen Maliqi's cogent "Kosovo kao katalizator jugoslovenske krize," in Slavko Gaber and Tonči Kuzmanić, *Kosovo - Srbija - Jugoslavija* (Ljubljana: Knjižnica revolucionarne teorije, 1989), 69-77.

²⁰⁸The most eloquent exponent of this view is undoubtedly Ivo Banac, who calls the failures of both Yugoslav states "structurally unavoidable," attributing them to the clash of irreconcilable national ideologies (above all, those of Serbs and Croats). See Banac's "Preface to the Second Paperback Printing" of his *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics*, (Ithaca, 1991), p. 15, and his "The Origins and Development of the Concept of Yugoslavia (to 1945)," *Yearbook of European Studies* 5 (1992): 22. Banac and similarly-minded scholars do not, of course, subscribe to the primordialist view of Yugoslavia's national conflicts often summarized as "ancient ethnic hatreds." Rather, they share a conviction that by 1918 (or by 1945 at the latest), two or more of Yugoslavia's peoples had acquired cultural, ideological, or historical freight that made their coexistence in a Yugoslav state impossible.

This author's view is closer to that put forward by John Lampe in his *Yugoslavia as History*. Lampe argues that "state-building rationales" competed with national ideologies throughout the existence of both Yugoslavias, and that the ideologies' eventual victory depended on external as well as internal factors. Cf. the broader argument in George Schöpflin, "Nationhood, Communism, and State Legitimation," *Nations and Nationalism* 1/1 (1995): 81-91.

²⁰⁹This paragraph summarizes information from Bilandžić, *Historija*, 502-11 and 522-24 and Wolfgang Höpken, "Party Monopoly and Political Change: the League of Communists since Tito's Death," in Ramet, ed., *Yugoslavia in the 1980s*, 38-41.

²¹⁰Bilandžić, *Historija*, 504.

²¹¹From Milošević's speech at the 18th Session of the CC LCS, November 1984, in Slobodan Milošević, *Godine raspleta* (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1989), 34.

²¹²Cf. Bilandžić, *Historija*, 523-28.

²¹³For differing Serb and Albanian perceptions of the demonstrations, see Julie A. Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths started a War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), Chapter One.

²¹⁴For the demonstrations, see Pedro Ramet, "Kosovo and the Limits of Yugoslav Socialist Patriotism," and Roux, *Les Albanais en Yougoslavie*, 366-79. A good brief description of the LCY's reaction to the demonstrations is Bilandžić, *Historija*, 495-98. For post-1981 repression against Albanians, see Sami Repishti, "Human Rights and the Albanian Nationality in Yugoslavia," in Gruenwald and Rosenblum-Cale, eds., *Human Rights in Yugoslavia*, 254-63 and 268-70; and Muhamedin Kullashi, "Kosovska kriza i kriza Jugoslavije," in Gaber and Kuzmanić, eds., *Kosovo - Srbija - Jugoslavija*, 21-22.

²¹⁵A good discussion of the emergence of Kosovo Serbs' organizations is Veljko Vujačić, "Communism and Nationalism in Russia and Serbia," (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1995), 220-30.

²¹⁶The insistence that Kosovo authorities were punishing the wrong people recurred in Belgrade petitions. Thus, in June of 1986, the Board for the Defense of Freedom of Thought and Expression petitioned the Kosovo Presidency for clemency for a group of Kosovo Albanians convicted of political crimes under Article 133. Aleksa Djilas, ed., *Srpsko pitanje* (Belgrade: Politika, 1991), 268-70.

²¹⁷The petition (with its list of signatories) is reprinted in Djilas, *Srpsko pitanje*, 260-68.

²¹⁸Cf. the language in the 1985 "Petition of 2016 Citizens from Kosovo," discussed in Vujačić, "Communism and Nationalism," 224-226. For more evidence of these beliefs, see the excellent article by Jasna Dragović, "Les intellectuels serbes et la "question" du Kosovo, 1981-1987," *Relations Internationales* No. 89 (1997), 53-70. See also Kullashi, "Kosovska kriza i kriza Jugoslavije," and Rexhep Qosja, *Nezaštićena sudbina: O Albancima u Jugoslaviji danas* (Zagreb: HSLS, 1990), *passim*.

²¹⁹Jasna Dragović, "Les intellectuels serbes et la "question" du Kosovo," is a convincing statement of this argument. A useful more general piece is Kjell Magnusson, "The Serbian reaction: Kosovo and ethnic mobilization among the Serbs," *Nordic Journal of Soviet & East European Studies* 4/3 (1987), 3-30.

²²⁰A few good starting-points for considering the causes of post-war Slavic emigration from Kosovo are Marina Blagojevic, "Iseljavanje sa Kosova," in Nebojša Popov, ed., *Srpska strana rata: trauma i katarza u istorijskom pamćenju* (Belgrade: Republika, 1996); the collection of articles in Gaber and Kuzmanić, eds., *Kosovo-*

Srbija-Jugoslavija; Srđa Popović, Dejan Janča and Tanja Petovar, eds., *Kosovski čvor: drešiti ili seći?* (Belgrade: Hronos, 1990); and Roux, *Les Albanais*, 379-95. See also Ruža Petrović and Marina Blagojević, *Seobe Srba i Crnogoraca sa Kosova i iz Metohija: rezultati ankete sprovedene 1985-86. godine* (Belgrade: SANU, 1989), which study is discussed further below. A somewhat modified version has been published in English as *The Migration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo and Metohija: results of the survey conducted in 1985-86*, tr. Tina Pribićević (Belgrade: SANU, 1992).

²²¹All the figures available involve some approximation, particularly for the period after the 1981 census. For the period between 1941 and 1981, about 100,000 Serbs and Montenegrins emigrated (Marina Blagojević, "Iseljavanje sa Kosova"). Petrović, *Migracije u Jugoslaviji*, 104-115, presents more detail for the period 1971-81. For estimates of post-1981 emigration, see Roux, *Les Albanais*, 390-93; Dragović, "Les intellectuels serbes et la "question" du Kosovo," 57; and Vučković and Nikolić, *Stanovništvo Kosova*, 126-7.

²²²These census figures are cited in Petrović and Blagojević, *Seobe Srba i crnogoraca*, 84.

²²³Roux, *Les Albanais*, 220-21.

²²⁴For various views of the demographics involved, see Hivzi Islami, "Demografski problemi Kosova i njihovo tumačenje," in Gaber and Kuzmanić, eds., *Kosovo - Srbija - Jugoslavija*, 41-43; Roux, *Les Albanais*, 143-58; and Blagojević, "Iseljavanje sa Kosova," 240-42. Lenard Cohen, citing Islami and other sources, notes that by 1971 the urban percentage of the Kosovo Albanian population had reached only 23.4% (up from 16.7% in 1961). Cohen, *Serpent in the Bosom*, 38 (n. 43).

²²⁵Dijana Pleština, *Regional Development in Communist Yugoslavia: Success, Failure, and Consequences* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 114 and *passim*.

²²⁶See, for instance, Fred Singleton and Bernard Carter, *The Economy of Yugoslavia* (London and Canberra: Croom Helm, 1982), 220-26 and Jens Reuter, *Die Albaner in Jugoslawien* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1982), 54-70.

²²⁷Unemployment figures are cited in Ramet, "Limits," 231. For a consideration of emigration from Kosovo in the context of other migrations within Yugoslavia, see Islami, "Demografski problemi," especially 58-66.

²²⁸See Popović et. al., *Kosovski čvor*, 12-15; Roux, *Les Albanais*, 393-94; and Ruža Petrović, *Migracije u Jugoslaviji i etnički aspekt* (Novi Beograd: Istraživačko izdavački centar SSO Srbije, 1987), 134-35 and 137-38.

²²⁹Petrović and Blagojević, *Seobe Srba i Crnogoraca*. Some of the study's main findings are summarized in Blagojević, "Iseljavanje sa Kosova," 244-46.

²³⁰Against the presumption that the Academy's institutional role influenced the survey's results, it should be noted that the study included measures to prevent the survey-takers' views from influencing the emigrants' (written) responses. For the study's methodology, see Petrović and Blagojević, *Seobe Srba i Crnogoraca*, 11-56. In part because respondents could give more than one reason for emigrating (see the questionnaire reprinted in Petrović and Blagojević, *Seobe Srba i Crnogoraca*, 39-56), the study's findings were open to widely different interpretations. For instance, compare Blagojević, "Iseljavanje Srba sa Kosova," with discussions of the study in Gaber and Kuzmanić, eds., *Kosovo - Srbija - Jugoslavije*, 29 and 132-33.

The poll was conducted in November of 1985 (for four of the areas polled) and May of 1986 (for the fifth). Petrović and Blagojević, *Seobe Srba i Crnogoraca*, 26. For the timing of emigration, see Petrović and Blagojević, *Seobe Srba i Crnogoraca*, 232.

²³¹Petrović and Blagojević, *Seobe Srba i Crnogoraca*, particularly 122-97. For a summary of the findings, see Blagojević, "Iseljavanje Srba sa Kosova."

Compare the accounts given in Mertus, *Kosovo*, 122-33 (from Serb emigres interviewed in 1995-96). See also Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, Chapter 11, and Louis Sell, *Slobodan Milošević and the Destruction of Yugoslavia* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 79-80.

²³²Petrović and Blagojević, *Seobe Srba i Crnogoraca*, 101-10. Of survey respondents older than 15, 41.5% reported that they knew Albanian (Blagojević, "Iseljavanje sa Kosova," 246). Cf. Vujačić, "Communism and Nationalism," 219. For a somewhat different interpretation, see Roux, *Les Albanais*, 387-88.

²³³This discussion of the Memorandum is adapted from Budding, "Systemic Crisis and National Mobilization" and from Chapter 6 of Budding, "Serb Intellectuals and the National Question."

The full text of the Memorandum (which was first published in Yugoslavia in 1989, in the Zagreb journal *Naše teme*, v. 33/1-2) appears in Kosta Mihailović and Vasilije Krestić, *"Memorandum SANU" Odgovori na kritike* (Belgrade, 1995), pp. 101-47. This work by two of the Memorandum's authors is a defense of the Memorandum against its many critics. It also includes a brief account of the work of the Memorandum Commission. It has been published in English as *Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts: answers to criticisms* (Belgrade, 1995).

Useful discussions of the Memorandum and its political context include Laura Silber and Allan Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation* (New York, 1995), pp. 31-33; Slavoljub Đukić, *Kako se dogodio vođa* (Belgrade, 1992), pp. 111-21 and the same author's slightly different discussion in *Između slave i anateme: politička biografija Slobodana Miloševića* (Belgrade, 1994), pp. 43-48. Two in-depth analytic discussions are Olivera Milosavljević's "Upotreba autoriteta nauke: Javna politička delatnost Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti (1986-1992)," and the same author's "Jugoslavija kao zabluda," both in Popov, ed., *Srpska strana rata*. (In the same volume, Ljubomir Madžar, "Ko koga eksploatiše" offers an interesting discussion of the Memorandum's economic argument.) See also Miloš Mišović, "Od Memoranduma do rata," *Vreme* (24 August 1992): I-VIII.

²³⁴ SANU *Godišnjak* 92 (1986) 97.

²³⁵ A list of Commission members, along with a brief account of the Commission's work, appears in the proceedings for the December 1986 SANU Convention. *Vanredna skupština Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti, održana 18. decembra 1986. godine* (Belgrade, 1989), p. 12. A list of the Working Group members appears in Krestić and Mihailović, *"Memorandum SANU,"* 14-15.

No one has conclusively established who was responsible for which parts of the draft document that eventually emerged from the Working Group. Both internal and external evidence, however, suggests that key roles were played by economist Kosta Mihailović (b. 1917), historian Vasilije Krestić (b. 1932), novelist Antonije Isaković (b. 1923), and philosopher Mihailo Marković (b. 1923).

Internal evidence for this assertion is presented in Chapter Six of Budding, "Serb Intellectuals and the National Question" and in Budding, "Systemic Crisis and National Mobilization." To sum up important external evidence: Isaković headed both the Commission and the Working Group (Krestić and Mihailović, *"Memorandum SANU,"* pp. 14-15). Krestić described himself in a 1991 interview as "one of the authors of the Memorandum, and precisely of that part which deals with national problems," Miloš Jevtić, *Istoričari: Radovan Samardžić, Sima Ćirković, Vasilije Krestić, Čedomir Popov* (Belgrade, 1992), p. 160. Kosta Mihailović's biographical entry in the SANU Yearbook describes him as "one of the authors of the Memorandum" (*SANU Godišnjak* 100 [1994]: 365). Moreover, a pair of usually well-informed journalists have written that Mihailović "is widely believed to be the Memorandum's main author." Silber and Little, *Yugoslavia*, p. 36. n.1. Finally, Krestić and Mihailović co-authored the defense of the Memorandum (*"Memorandum SANU" Odgovori na kritike*) published by SANU in 1995.

A number of observers have claimed that novelist Dobrica Ćosić was one of the Memorandum's authors, or even its principal author. (See, e.g., Ramet, *Balkan Babel*, p. 200.) Ćosić was not a member of the Commission, and both he and the Memorandum's acknowledged authors have repeatedly denied that he wrote any part of the Memorandum. Ćosić has said, however, that he received the draft of the Memorandum in September, and offered the Commission thirty-eight pages of comments just before its work was interrupted.

The present author has found no reason to believe that Ćosić wrote any part of the Memorandum. Its heavily economic emphasis is quite foreign to him, and much of what is common to both the Memorandum and Ćosić - such as the interpretation of events in Kosovo - is too general, and was too pervasive among Serb intellectuals in the mid-1980s, to be proof of either authorship or influence. Nevertheless, some parallels between the Memorandum and Ćosić are close enough to suggest his influence, whether exerted directly during the Memorandum's preparation, or indirectly through prior influence on its authors. It is difficult to distinguish between the two, because Ćosić's ideas were so well-known among nationally-minded Belgrade intellectuals by the time the Memorandum was written.

Having said all this, one must also note that at a later period (1989-90) Ćosić used his immense prestige to support the idea that Yugoslavia was untenable (because Slovenes and Croats did not want it) and should be dissolved on the basis of nationally-organized referendums. See, e.g., his June 1989 speech in Budva and his 3 August 1990 interview in NIN. The Budva speech is reprinted in Ćosić's *Srpsko pitanje - demokratsko pitanje* (Belgrade: Politika, 1992), 187-201.

²³⁶ See Mihailović and Krestić, *"Memorandum SANU"* pp. 14-17. Except for the composition of the Working Group, it adds relatively little information to the report that SANU General Secretary and Commission member

Dejan Medaković delivered to the SANU Extraordinary Convention held in December of 1986 (*Vanredna skupština*, pp. 11-16). See also the convention speeches of Ivan Maksimović (*Vanredna skupština*, pp. 65-69) and Kosta Mihailović (*Vanredna skupština*, pp. 112-13).

²³⁷ See *Vanredna skupština*, *passim*.

²³⁸ All citations are taken from the text of the Memorandum published in Krestić and Mihailović, "Memorandum SANU," pp. 101-47. The translations are mine.

²³⁹ "Memorandum SANU," p. 101.

²⁴⁰ "Memorandum SANU," pp. 110-18.

²⁴¹ "Memorandum SANU," p. 111.

²⁴² "Memorandum SANU," p. 114.

²⁴³ "Memorandum SANU," p. 115.

²⁴⁴ "Memorandum SANU," pp. 121-25.

²⁴⁵ "Memorandum SANU," p. 126.

²⁴⁶ "Memorandum SANU," p. 128.

²⁴⁷ "Memorandum SANU," pp. 134 and 136 (for Kosovo), and p. 139 (for Croatia).

²⁴⁸ "Memorandum SANU," p. 146.

²⁴⁹ "Memorandum SANU," p. 144.

²⁵⁰ "Memorandum SANU," p. 145.

²⁵¹ "Memorandum SANU," 146.

²⁵² Belgrade Party chief Dragiša Pavlović, cited in *Borba* 16 October 1986. Similarly, academician and historian Vasa Čubrilović (speaking at the Academy) said that he had heard the Memorandum's argument before: in 1937, when Slobodan Jovanović founded the Serbian Cultural Club on the premise that Serbs must develop their own national program as others were doing. (Čubrilović had himself been a founding member of the Club.) The Second World War and the defeat of the Chetnik movement, Čubrilović argued, had discredited this Serbian option once and for all. Serbs had chosen the Yugoslav way, and could not solve their own problems without accommodating the interests of others in Yugoslavia. *Vanredna skupština*, 26-27.

²⁵³ Cf. Ivo Banac's point that: "The novelty of the memorandum was its questioning of Yugoslavia as the optimal solution for the Serbs." Banac, "The Dissolution of Yugoslav Historiography," in Sabrina P. Ramet and Ljubisa S. Adamovic, eds., *Beyond Yugoslavia: politics, economics, and culture in a shattered community* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 55.

²⁵⁴ Stambolić at a July 1979 meeting, in Ivan Stambolić, *Rasprave o SR Srbiji, 1979-1987* (Zagreb: Globus, 1988), 9-19.

²⁵⁵ See, for instance, Stambolić's speeches at the Presidency of the CC LCY on 9 July 1985 (Stambolić, *Rasprave*, 106-12), at the Serbian Central Committee on 10 January 1986 (Stambolić, *Rasprave*, 146-53), and to the citizens of Kosovo Polje on 6 April 1986 (Stambolić, *Rasprave*, 166-68). In his public reply to the Memorandum, Stambolić took care to rebut its claim that the Serbian leadership had neglected Serbia's interests. See his speech at Belgrade University, 30 October 1986, in Stambolić, *Rasprave*, 215-19. See also the speech of Vukoje Bulatović,

Vice President of the Serbian state presidency, at the SANU convention held in December 1986 (*Vanredna skupština*, 17-22).

²⁵⁶For instance, Sabrina Petra Ramet has asserted that the Memorandum "did more than any other tract or pamphlet written up to then to mobilize Serbian resentment of non-Serbs and legitimate Serbian hatred of all non-Serbs, whether inside or outside Yugoslavia." Sabrina P. Ramet, *Balkan Babel: Politics, Culture and Religion in Yugoslavia* (Boulder, CO, 1996), p. 200. Branka Magaš calls the Memorandum "a document that provided the blueprint not only for Serbia's onslaught upon the entire Federal order, but also for the 1991-92 war." Branka Magaš, *The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-Up 1980-92* (London, 1993), p. 4.

²⁵⁷For some examples, see Aleksandar Pavković, "The Serb National Idea: A Revival 1986-92," *Slavonic and East European Review* 72 (July 1994): 440-55.

²⁵⁸For Milošević's public reaction to the Memorandum, see Cohen, *Serpent in the Bosom*, 58-60.

²⁵⁹When Milošević formed his Socialist Party of Serbia in July of 1990, four members of the Memorandum Commission were elected to the party's Main Board of one hundred and eleven people. Antonije Isaković won 1105 out of 1297 delegate votes, second only to Milošević ally Borisav Jović (at that time president of the Yugoslav presidency). Mihailo Marković, with 1073 votes, came in fifth on the list of candidates and also became the party's Vice President. SANU president Dušan Kanazir and economist Miloš Macura were also elected to the Board. Moreover, economist Kosta Mihailović became an important Milošević adviser. See Silber and Little, *Yugoslavia*, 36, n. 1, and the post-1987 functions listed in Mihailović's biography in SANU *Godišnjak* 100 (1994), 365-71.

²⁶⁰Belgrade Communist leader Dragiša Pavlović, in a speech of 11 September 1987, charged Serbian nationalists with pledging "easily promised speed" (*olako obećana brzina*) in solving Serbia's problems. This famous speech served Milošević as the occasion to bring down Pavlović and, with him, Ivan Stambolić, leaving himself as the unchallenged leader of Serbia's Communists. Pavlović later commented that he had meant the phrase to apply to SANU and the Association of Writers of Serbia - i.e., nationalists in the opposition - but that those who believed the phrase pointed at Milošević understood Milošević's program better than he did at the time. Pavlović, *Olako obećana brzina*, 94-100 (for the text of the speech), and 371-72.

²⁶¹This paragraph draws on two excellent accounts of Milošević's early career: Chapter 2 of Lenard J. Cohen, *Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milošević* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001); and Chapters 1 and 2 of Louis Sell, *Slobodan Milošević and the Destruction of Yugoslavia* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002).

²⁶²Cf. Cohen, *Serpent in the Bosom*, 55-56.

²⁶³This account of Milošević's speech draws on Cohen, *Serpent in the Bosom*, 62-65 and Sell, *Slobodan Milošević*, 1-4.

²⁶⁴Milošević's speech to the Kosovo Polje delegates is reprinted in Slobodan Milošević, *Godine raspleta* (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1989), 140-146.

²⁶⁵For the general process of Yugoslavia's dissolution, I have used mainly Lenard Cohen, *Broken Bonds: the Disintegration of Yugoslavia* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995 [2nd ed.]); Susan Woodward *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995); and Laura Silber and Allan Little *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation* (New York: Penguin, 1997). A very useful chronology is Slobodanka Kovačević and Putnik Dajić, *Hronologija jugoslovenske krize 1942-1993* (Belgrade: Institut za evropske studije, 1994).

I have also made particular use of Lenard Cohen's *Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milošević* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001) and Louis Sell's *Slobodan Milošević and the Destruction of Yugoslavia* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002). These works incorporate extensive material from the Yugoslav press and other sources, as well as drawing on the authors' interviews with participants in the events described. Other sources used are cited in the individual notes below.

²⁶⁶Some scholars have argued that a post-Communist Yugoslavia was impossible: see Ivo Banac's assertion that "...post-war Yugoslavia is itself the product of Communist rule. In Yugoslavia, post-Communism also means post-Yugoslavism" ("Post-Communism as Post-Yugoslavism: the Yugoslav Non-Revolutions of 1989-1990," in Banac, ed., *Eastern Europe in Revolution* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 186.

²⁶⁷ *Federalizam i nacionalno pitanje: zbirka radova* [Proceedings of a symposium held in Novi Sad on March 26-28, 1971] (Belgrade: Savez udruženja za političke nauke, 1971), 45. A somewhat different version of this argument appears in Budding, "Yugoslavs into Serbs."

²⁶⁸ Good summaries of the Eighth Session's importance are Sell, *Slobodan Milošević*, 47-51 and Cohen, *Serpent in the Bosom*, 67-71.

²⁶⁹ See Sell, *Slobodan Milošević*, 54-64; Cohen, *Serpent in the Bosom*, 74-77; and Chapter Four of Silber and Little, *Yugoslavia*.

²⁷⁰ Human rights abuses are chronicled in Helsinki Watch, *Yugoslavia: Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo, 1990-1992* (New York: Helsinki Watch, 1992).

The political conflict between Serbia and Kosovar Albanians escalated in step with the general Yugoslav crisis. On July 2, 1990 (the day on which Slovenes declared their sovereignty), 114 of the 123 Albanian delegates to the Kosovo assembly – meeting outside the assembly building, because the Serbian government had earlier taken steps to adjourn the assembly – declared that Kosovo was "an equal and independent entity within the framework of the Yugoslav federation." In response, the Serbian parliament dissolved the provincial parliament, instituting direct rule from Belgrade. See Cohen, *Broken Bonds*, 121-23 and (for the quotation) Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 346.

²⁷¹ A good source for this is Jens Reuter, "Vom ordnungspolitischen zum Nationalitätenkonflikt zwischen Serbien und Slowenien," *Südosteuropa* 39/10 (1990), 576-77

²⁷² The competing programs are summarized in Cohen, *Broken Bonds*, 58-64.

²⁷³ See Sell, *Slobodan Milošević*, 98-99; Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, 110; and Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*, 353. In the spring of 1990, the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia ruled some of the Slovene amendments (as well as various other amendments passed by other republics) illegal, but the rulings remained a dead letter.

²⁷⁴ See Sell, *Slobodan Milošević*, 100-101 and Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*, 353-54.

²⁷⁵ Cohen, *Broken Bonds*, 83.

²⁷⁶ An insightful brief discussion of the Congress is Dennison Rusinow's "The Avoidable Catastrophe," in Sabrina P. Ramet and Ljubisa S. Adamovich, eds., *Beyond Yugoslavia: Politics, Economics, and Culture in a Shattered Community*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 22-23.

²⁷⁷ This section is adapted from portions of Budding, "Serb Intellectuals and the National Question," Chapter 7.

²⁷⁸ Milošević, *Godine raspleta*, 153.

²⁷⁹ Milošević, *Godine raspleta*, 277. The speech included Serbian rhetoric also, which was typical for Milošević throughout 1988. For more on this point, see Veljko Vujačić's "Communism and Nationalism in Russia and Serbia" (Ph.D. Diss., University of California at Berkeley, 1995), 330-335.

²⁸⁰ Milošević, *Godine raspleta*, 330.

²⁸¹ In his published diary, Borisav Jović (who was at the time Serbia's representative on the Yugoslav Presidency and one of Milošević's closest allies) has asserted that in a meeting held on March 26 1990 leading members of Serbia's political establishment (the "koordinacija") concluded that "the process of the collapse of Yugoslavia is being realized in the same way that this happened with the LCY. It seems unstoppable to us. Serbia will pursue... the survival of federal Yugoslavia, but will prepare itself to live without Yugoslavia also" According to Jović, the leaders argued that Serbia could not accept a confederal solution because it would then be unable to protect the interests of Serbs in other republics, and believed that a war for territory in some areas (Bosnia-Herzegovina was specified) would inevitably follow from Yugoslavia's dissolution. Borisav Jović, *Poslednji dani SFRJ: izbori iz dnevnika* (Belgrade: Politika, 1995), 131. Cf. the discussion of this meeting in Sell, *Slobodan Milošević*, 108.

²⁸² Cf. the assessments cited in Cohen, *Broken Bonds*, 125-26.

²⁸³ The relevant portion reads: "Član 72. Republika Srbija uređuje i obezbeđuje:

1. suverenost, nezavisnost i teritorijalnu celokupnost Republike Srbije i njen međunarodni položaj i odnose s drugim državama i međunarodnim organizacijama;". *Ustav Republike Srbije sa Ustavnim zakonom za sprovođenje Ustava i Izbornim zakonima* (Belgrade: PJ Pravno ekonomski centar Beograd), 19.

²⁸⁴ In the original, "odlučuje o ratu i miru" and "ratifikuje međunarodne ugovore."

²⁸⁵ Article 135 in its entirety reads: "Prava i dužnosti koje Republika Srbija, koja je u sastavu Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije, ima po ovom ustavu, a koji se prema saveznom ustavu ostvaruje u federaciji, ostvarivaće se u skladu sa saveznim ustavom.

Kad se aktima organa federacije ili aktima organa druge republike, protivno pravima i dužnostima koje ona ima po Ustavu Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije, narušava ravnopravnost Republike Srbije ili se na drugi način ugrožavaju interesi Republike Srbije, a pri tom nije obezbeđena kompenzacija, republički organi donose akte radi zaštite interesa Republike Srbije."

²⁸⁶ See Articles 108-112, and Article 130.

²⁸⁷ The translation of this passage is from *The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia* (Belgrade: Kultura, 1990), 35, as cited in Cohen, *Broken Bonds*, 126.

²⁸⁸ *Politika* 26 June 1990.

²⁸⁹ See, for instance, Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*, 357 and Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, 130.

²⁹⁰ In his memoirs, Janez Drnovšek (at that time Slovenia's representative on Yugoslavia's federal presidency) states that from August of 1990 both Milošević and Borisav Jović made it clear to him that they would not oppose Slovenia's independence. Janez Drnovšek, *Echappes de l'enfer: la verite d'un president* (Martigny: Editions Latour, 1996), 207. Jović's diary confirms this; see, e.g., his entry for 30 July 1990 (Jović, *Poslednji dani*, 173). See also Silber and Little, *Death of a Nation*, 113-14 (citing Slovene president Milan Kučan's account of a January 1991 meeting with Milošević).

²⁹¹ For background on JNA-LCY relations, see James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (London: Pinter, 1992), 56-61 and *passim*.

²⁹² Cf. Sell, *Slobodan Milošević*, 120.

²⁹³ For contrasts between the JNA and the Serbian leadership's policies at this time, see Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military*, Chapter 6; Cohen, *Broken Bonds*, 181-92 and 206-7; and Sell, *Slobodan Milošević*, 120-24.

²⁹⁴ An interesting assessment of how the generals' Partisan convictions shaped their attitudes during Yugoslavia's dissolution is in Drnovšek, *Echappes de l'enfer*, 190-91. See also Sell, *Slobodan Milošević*, 122.

Throughout this period, Milošević and his SPS supporters condemned the Chetniks. In June of 1987, Milošević had said, "Even today the Chetniks are remembered with disgust...[and their movement] as the greatest treachery in the history of the Serbian people (Milošević, *Godine raspleta*, 154).

²⁹⁵ Socijalistička Partija Srbije, Glavni Odbor, *Programske osnove Socijalističke Partije Srbije* (Belgrade: SPS, October 1990), 34-36.

²⁹⁶ The anti-nationalist Yugoslav option was represented by two organizations which cooperated in the 1990 elections: the *Udruženje za jugoslovensku demokratsku inicijativu* (Union for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative, or UJDI) and Prime Minister Ante Marković's *Savez reformskih snaga* (Alliance of Reform Forces). Neither enjoyed much electoral success, in Serbia or elsewhere. In Serbia's 1990 parliamentary elections, UJDI received 24,982 votes (.49% of votes cast). The Alliance of Reform Forces for Serbia received 27,358 votes (.54%), and the Alliance of Reform Forces for Vojvodina 74,748 (1.48%). The joint UJDI-Alliance presidential candidate, Belgrade professor of Byzantine history Ivan Đurić, did considerably better with 5.52% of votes cast.

²⁹⁷ *Borba*, 30 April - 2 May 1990.

²⁹⁸ *Borba*, 1-2 September 1990.

²⁹⁹ This discussion of the SPO is adapted from Chapter 7 of Budding, "Serb Intellectuals and the National Question."

³⁰⁰ *Srpska reč* #1 ((1 June 1990), 34.

³⁰¹ *Srpska reč* #6 (5 November 1990), 20.

³⁰² *Borba*, 11 May 1990.

³⁰³ *Vjesnik*, 19 September 1990.

³⁰⁴ Drašković interview in *Start*, 16 September 1989, reprinted in *Glas crkve* No. 4 (1989), 36-40.

³⁰⁵ *Srpska reč*, 8 July 1991.

³⁰⁶ For these reburials and their significance, see Bette Denich, "Dismembering Yugoslavia: Nationalist Ideologies and the Symbolic Revival of Genocide," *American Ethnologist* 21 (1994), 367-390. A conceptually subtle discussion of the interplay of top-down and bottom-up factors in creating the perception of endangerment is Anthony Oberschall, "The Manipulation of Ethnicity: From Ethnic Cooperation to Violence and War in Yugoslavia," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 23, no. 6 (2000): 982-1001.

³⁰⁷ Chapter 15 of journalist Marcus Tanner's *Croatia: A Nation Forged in War* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1997) offers a balanced presentation of the HDZ's initial policies.

³⁰⁸Tribunal Document, "Zapisnik sa razgovora gospodina dr. Franje Tuđmana, predsjednika Republike Hrvatske s predsjednicima republika i predsjednicima predsjedništava republika, održanog 28. ožujka 1991. u vili "Dalmacija" u Splitu." Hereafter, the document is referred to as *Zapisnik*. This meeting was the first of six such interrepublican summits.

³⁰⁹During the meeting, Tuđman read out a letter from Croatia's Interior Minister describing the clashes. *Zapisnik*, 01510566-67.

³¹⁰Kovačević and Dajić, *Hronologija jugoslovenske krize*, 35. The political context of spring 1991 is set out in Chapter 7 of Cohen, *Broken Bonds*.

³¹¹Tanner, *Croatia*, 242, provides Tuđman adviser Slaven Letica's account of the meeting.

³¹²For example, he stated: "Slovenija je donijela svoje odluke, samo je pitanje njihovg [sic] efektuiranja i to je vreme koje je tada bilo oročeno na 6 mjeseci, ono ističe 23. juna, bilo vrijeme u kojem je trebalo napraviti napor da li je moguće sa drugim republikama dogovoriti da se to uradi sporazumima" (*Zapisnik*, 01510628-29). Without completely excluding the possibility of some future form of association, Kučan considered this a separate issue that could only be addressed after independence was realized (*Zapisnik*, 01510550, 01510629-10634).

Because this document is unpublished, I have included fairly extensive citations to substantiate my conclusions. I have translated them only where their exact wording affects my argument.

³¹³At this meeting, Gligorov's main proposal was that the republics should agree to dissolve the existing union, but at the same moment create a new one on a different basis. He believed that this was consistent with Slovenia's position, but Milan Kučan did not. For example (in the context of a discussion of national self-determination), Gligorov said:

"Ako to obezbedimo da teče paralelno i to u momentu kada prestaje kako da kažem dosadašnja zajednica, istovremeno stupa u dejstvo nova dogovorena zajednica, to je onda nešto drugo. To je druga jedna sigurnost.

Tu se ja sporim sa Kučanom i neprekidno ne možemo da se razumemo." *Zapisnik*, 01510669.

Izetbegović, for his part, offered to accept any proposal for Yugoslavia's future organization that recognized Bosnia's sovereignty and was acceptable to both Serbia and Croatia. "U ovom trenutku nama uz uslov priznanja suverenosti Bosne i Hercegovine odgovara svako rješenje buduće Jugoslavije koje odgovara republikama Srbiji i Hrvatskoj." *Zapisnik*, 01510610.

³¹⁴In explaining his stance, Tuđman referred to the fact that many Croats lived outside Croatia. "Gospodine Miloševiću, da dio hrvatskog naroda, startan dio hrvatskog naroda ne živi izvan Republike Hrvatske, mi bismo već davno i prije Slovenije donijeli odluku kakvu Slovenija forsira da je donese u roku od 15 dana itd.

Prema tome jasno je da je to složeno, ali kažimo ovo, na temelju sveukupnog iskustva da težimo da se jugoslavenska zajednica izradi na osnovama suverenosti, dobrovoljnog ugovora, dogovora suverenosti republika i ostavimo onda sva pitanja ova o kojima vi govorite da raspravljamo." *Zapisnik*, 01510654.

³¹⁵For instance, he said "Šta će se desiti ako se npr. sada zbog toga što mi prihvatimo ovde da smo svi suverene države, polazim od primera Crne Gore formira Muslimansko nacionalno veće i proglasi odcjepljenje od Crne gore, proglasi se Srpsko nacionalno vijeće i proglasi odcjepljenje krajine od Bosne i Hercegovine, kninska krajina ide do kraja." *Zapisnik*, 01510647.

³¹⁶In the original and without ellipses, the exchange runs:

"Dr Franjo Tuđman: AVNOJ-evska Jugoslavija ne postoji od onda kada ste vi u Srbiji proveli one promjene. To je činjenica i kada se desilo sve ono što smo konstatirali i ustavom poslije vas Ustavom Hrvatske i plebiscitom Slovenije, deklaracijom Makedonije itd.

Prema tome, jesmo već u jednom prijelaznom razdoblju i ne možemo ga strpati.

Osim toga, vi ste bili taj koji ste govorili i institucionalno i vaninstitucionalno itd. da mijenjate stanje i mijenjali ste.

Prema tome, ne mogu se sada pokušati vraćati na to.

Slobodan Milošević: Mi smo mijenjali stanje u Srbiji, nismo mijenjali stanje u Jugoslaviji.

Dr Franjo Tuđman: To vaše mijenjanje je utjecalo na...". *Zapisnik*, 01510650.

³¹⁷"A ti stalno govoriš o ustavnom putu, u [sic] ustavu koga vi ne priznajete, vi prvi i najviše." *Zapisnik*, 01510635-6. See also this exchange between Tuđman and Milošević: "Slobodan Milošević: Suverenost republika je pitanje o kojem razgovaramo mi mjesecima.

Dr Franjo Tuđman: To piše u današnjem ustavu. Mi se ne možemo vraćati natrag, a osim toga vi ste donijeli svoj Ustav kojim ste proglasili potpuno samostalnost." *Zapisnik*, 01510759.

³¹⁸At one point, Milošević stated this position as follows:

"Jugoslavija kao državna zajednica ravnopravnih naroda u međunarodno priznatim granicama postoji i bilo kakva promena njenog državnog uređenja moguća je jedino na osnovu slobodno izražene volje svakog njenog naroda ponaosob na referendumu, s obzirom na pravo svakog naroda na samoopredjeljenje uključujući i pravo na odcjepljenje.

U slučaju korišćenja ovog prava, neophodno je prethodno regulisati pitanje međusobnih granica uz uvažavanje nacionalnih, historijskih, kulturnih i drugih interesa svakog jugoslovenskog naroda." *Zapisnik*, 01510581.

³¹⁹ For the terminology applied to "national minorities" in Yugoslavia, see Šušar, *Nacije i međunacionalni odnosi*, 120.

³²⁰ The entire relevant exchange runs as follows:

"Slobodan Milošević: To nije pitanje perfekcije, ne postoje nigdje perfektne granice, ali primjerom te konfederalne formule, ne postoji narod koji bi bio više podjeljen nego što bi to bio slučaj sa srpskim narodom.

Ako vi to ne možete da uvažite...

Dr Franjo Tuđman: Albanski, makedonski...a Nijemci.

Slobodan Milošević: Što se Albanaca tiče oni su nacionalna manjina, a koji je to procenat Njemaca, molim vas izvan Njemačke...

Dr Franjo Tuđman: Austrija, Švicarska...

Milan Kučan: Francuska, Poljska, Češka." *Zapisnik*, 01510614.

³²¹ *Intervju*, 23 November 1990.

³²² Milošević on 25 April 1987, in his *Godine raspleta*, 147.

³²³ Cf. Sabrina Petra Ramet, "Introduction: The Roots of Discord and the Language of War," in Ramet and Adamovich, eds., *Beyond Yugoslavia*, 5-6.

³²⁴ "Meni bi trebao netko da objasni što znači nacionalni referendum i što bi on praktično značio u jednom Sarajevu, u kojem od 600 hiljada ljudi živi 250, 350 hiljada Muslimana, 170 ili 180 hiljada Srba, 80 hiljada Hrvata i još onih ostalih naroda i narodnosti." *Zapisnik*, 01510611.

³²⁵ "Alija Izetbegović: Na nacionalni referendum, i onda građanski rat u Sarajevu, pucaju ljudi s prozora jedan na drugog, to će nam se dogoditi." *Zapisnik*, 01510752.

³²⁶ Alija Izetbegović: Onda je manji problem, ali zato mislim da bi trebalo držati jugoslavensku zajednicu država u kojoj bi bilo dovoljno garancije, to bi bila ta zajednica, ne bi bila ista država, ali bi bila jedna zajednica država.

Slobodan Milošević: Ako je to zajednica suverenih država, onda tih garancija nema." *Zapisnik*, 01510612-13.

³²⁷ Kučan said: "Evropa je bila problem stvorila zaštitu onih dijelova naroda koji ne mogu živjeti u matičnim svojim državama.

I ja s time najviše imam iskustva, znam kako te izgleda." *Zapisnik*, 01510693.

³²⁸ Bulatović said: "Ja vas molim da imamo u vidu da mi živimo u jednoj uzavreloj političkoj klimi i objektivno živimo na Balkanu. Mnoga rešenja koja su ovdje u opticaju meni su veoma bliska, i zaista poštovanje građanskih i ljudskih prava bi riješilo sve ovo što kod nas ima.

Ali kod nas upravo vri zbog toga što mi dugo godina nismo poštovali elementarna, ljudska, građanska prava. Pojavila se mržnja i nepovjerenje, nedoumica.

To je ono što kod mene samo uliva pesimizam." *Zapisnik*, 01510648.

³²⁹ An exchange between Kučan and Milošević is worth citing at length, for it goes to the heart of the problem.

"Milan Kučan: "Ovdje u tom dokumentu nigdje ne stoji, ono je pretpostavka, ali mora biti jasno napisano, da prvo da bi rešili političku krizu priznajemo svakom narodu, odnosno republici u kojoj živi zajedno sa drugim građanima, ne svoje nacionalnosti, pravo da ostvari svoje pravo na samoopredjeljenje.

Slobodan Milošević: Dobro, je li ti stavljaš znak jednakosti između naroda i republike?

Milan Kučan: Da.

Slobodan Milošević: Ja ga ne stavljam.

Milan Kučan: U tome je sada problem.

Slobodan Milošević: A znaš zašto ga ti stavljaš, ti možeš da ga stavljaš zato što je Slovenija u specifičnom položaju. Ja ne mogu da ga stavljam...

Milan Kučan: Oprosti, ja sam tebi već na to odgovorio, Slovenija je u mnogo nezgodnijem položaju nego Srbija, odnosno srpski narod.

Naš narod je podijeljen na četiri države. I ne malim procentom.

I ja ne mogu rešavati problem Slovenaca koji žive u drugim političko pravnim tijelima.
Slobodan Milošević: Možeš problem Slovenaca koji žive u Jugoslaviji.
Milan Kučan: Ne. Problem Slovenaca koji žive u Sloveniji."

Zapisnik, 01510637-39.

Kučan's frequent use of "narod, odnosno republika" ("the people, that is to say the republic") also shows great continuity with earlier Slovene positions: it was noted above that Kardelj made use of this expression in explaining the 1971 amendments.

In this regard, a statement Tuđman made during the Split meeting is highly illuminating. Trying (yet again) to find a formula for a joint press statement, Tuđman suggested using the expression "narod, odnosno republika" to cloak disagreement on fundamental issues, and resuming discussions later. It is impossible to read his words without imagining that they were repeated over and over during socialist Yugoslavia's constitutional evolution.

"Dr Franjo Tuđman: Dajmo prihvatimo ovu formulaciju koja svakog njenog naroda, odnosno republike pa prema tome, podrazumijeva i ovo što vi hoćete. Može braniti, znači ne može biti po nacionalnom republika, a vi možete braniti zahtjev da može, pa ćemo se u daljnjim razgovorima o tome raspraviti." *Zapisnik*, 01510761.

³³⁰ The context for this remark shows the participants' frustration after hours of trying to reach agreement on a joint statement for the press:

"Slobodan Milošević: ...Novinarima ćemo da objasnimo da se ni u čemu ne slažemo, to će da bude najbolji efekat koji smo postigli na današnjoj sednici.

Milan Kučan: To i odgovara istini. Konačno ćemo morati priznati istinu. Jer do kraja ćemo doći do pitanja, ovo uređenje ne odgovara Republici Srbiji odnosno srpskom narodu. To će biti na kraju odgovori.

Ako je tako onda od toga podjimo sledeći put. Kako rešiti u uslovima kako su se historijski stvorili problem srpskog naroda." *Zapisnik*, 01510692.